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For more than a decade, American defense and foreign policy leaders have declared China the top long-term competitor — what the Pentagon refers to as the “pacing threat” — and the Indo-Pacific the priority theater. From the Obama-era “Pivot to Asia” to the Trump and Biden administrations’ strategic guidance, the message has been consistent: the future of U.S. power projection, deterrence, and economic competition hinges on our presence in the Pacific. But each time the Middle East ignites, that focus slips — and China quietly gains ground.
I spent time at Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC), the Marine Corps’ service component to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, during the height of the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), when the U.S. was recalibrating its posture across the Indo-Pacific. The effort aimed to build a more distributed and survivable presence — in places like Guam, northern Australia, and the Philippines. But even then, it was evident: whenever the Middle East flared, CENTCOM drew the bulk of attention, airlift, and decision-making energy. The Indo-Pacific, despite its declared importance, was routinely sidelined in practice.
The current Israel–Iran confrontation is no different. Once again, the situation threatens to pull U.S. strategic focus back toward the Middle East. Intelligence assets, air defense deployments, and senior-level attention are already shifting in that direction. While Indo-Pacific Command continues to face the most consequential long-term challenges, CENTCOM risks becoming the gravitational center — as it so often has when the region flares.
This isn’t just about assets — it’s about opportunity cost. Naval deployments to safeguard shipping through the Strait of Hormuz come at the expense of presence and deterrence elsewhere — particularly in the South China Sea, where illegal Chinese claims remain active and contested. Every ISR sortie diverted to monitor proxy threats in Iraq is one less covering Chinese maritime activity near the Senkakus or Luzon Strait.
And while we react, China builds. Slowly. Systematically. Its military footprint in Djibouti is no accident — it’s a strategic outpost at a maritime chokepoint. Its port investments across the Indian Ocean and Pacific Islands aren’t just economic — they’re pre-positioning efforts. When we take our eyes off the Indo-Pacific, China doesn’t pause. It capitalizes.
China approaches competition through the lens of history. As the so-called “Middle Kingdom,” it sees itself not as a rising power, but a returning one — resuming its rightful place atop the global order. This civilizational mindset informs a strategy that is deliberate, patient, and deeply focused on shaping the long-term environment. While the U.S. often pivots in response to political cycles or regional flare-ups, China plays a generational game. It builds influence not through sudden moves, but through steady, consistent pressure — diplomatic, economic, and military.
That’s exactly why Beijing gains ground whenever Washington is distracted. Each time the U.S. shifts focus away from the Indo-Pacific to manage another Middle East crisis, it reinforces the perception — and the reality — that America’s attention is fleeting. We’ve seen this cycle before: bold strategic visions for Asia undermined by operational whiplash. That reflex — understandable, but strategically corrosive — must be broken.
Policymakers must ensure our Indo-Pacific commitments are not just articulated — but upheld. That requires more than rotating headlines and reshuffled priorities. It means embedding the Indo-Pacific as the center of gravity in U.S. strategy — with permanent presence, reliable funding, and consistent senior-level focus. Every crisis response should be evaluated not just on immediate necessity, but on its strategic cost to long-term competition with China.
Because China isn’t just watching — it’s expanding. From a naval base in Djibouti to deep port investments in South America, Beijing is positioning itself as a global power with global reach. The pacing threat is no longer regional. If the United States continues treating its Indo-Pacific posture as flexible or disposable, it should not be surprised when China treats the 21st century as its own.
Anthony Quitugua is a former U.S. Marine officer and veteran of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. He is currently a cybersecurity executive focusing on national security strategy and international affairs.
